This paper concerns multistage games, with and without discounting, in which each player can increase the level of an action over time so as to increase the other players' future payoffs. An action profile is achievable if it is the limit point of a subgame perfect equilibrium path. Necessary conditions are derived for achievability under relatively general conditions. They imply that any efficient profile that is approximately achievable must be in the core of the underlying coalitional game. In some but not all games with discounting, the necessary conditions for achievability are also sufficient for a profile to be the limit of achievable profiles as the period length shrinks to zero. Consequently, in these games when the period length is very short, (i) the set of achievable profiles does not depend on the move structure; (ii) an efficient profile can be approximately achieved if and only if it is in the core; and (iii) any achievable profile can be achieved almost instantly.
Introduction
A dynamic contribution game is defined broadly here to be a multiperiod game in which each player can increase the level of an action incrementally, thereby increasing the other players' future payoffs. Such games exhibit positive spillovers that do not diminish with time. A leading application is one in which the actions are cumulative contributions of a private good to the production of a durable public good. The game is then a model of a fund drive, or sequence of fund drives, such as those held to finance church or university building projects or public radio programs.
1 Another application is to adoption and entry: agents decide when to invest in a new technology, and the future returns from adoption increase as the number of adopters grows.
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Another application is to holdup: a seller and buyer make pre-trade investments over time in an asset's quality, and perhaps periodic payments to each other. 3 Yet another is to partnership:
partners contribute effort over time in order to increase a common capital stock.
Some dynamic contribution games have unique equilibria that can be characterized by backwards induction. For example, this is true in Admati and Perry (1991) and Compte and Jehiel (2003) because of their restriction to a binary public good -backward induction starts in the period in which the threshold provision point is reached. If instead the payoff functions are smooth, backwards induction generally cannot be used and multiple equilibria exist. Results in this case have been fragmentary. Typically, for example, the existence of an equilibrium that achieves an (approximately) efficient outcome is established by construction, as in Marx and Matthews (2000) , Lockwood and Thomas (2002) , and Pitchford and Snyder (2004) , without a systematic exploration of other equilibria.
The goal of this paper is to characterize as fully as possible the set of equilibrium outcomes of a range of dynamic contribution games. Even the size of this set of outcomes is an issue.
As in a repeated game, it might be large because current deviations may by severely punished by triggering a decrease in the future contributions of the other players. 4 On the other hand, it might be small because the ability to punish deviations is diminished once sunk contributions 1 Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) , Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) , Admati and Perry (1991) , Marx and Matthews (2000) , Compte and Jehiel (2003) , Yildirim (2006) , Duffy, Ochs, and Vesterlund (2007) , and Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2010) study dynamic contribution games to fund a public project.
2 Gale (1995) , Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2008) , and Ochs and Park (2010) study dynamic adoption games.
3 Pitchford and Snyder (2004) and Che and Sakovics (2004) study dynamic holdup games. 4 The folk theorem of Dutta (1995) for stochastic games does not apply to the games of this paper because they do not satisfy its "asymptotic state independence" assumptions, (A1) and (A2). Indeed, we shall see that a folk theorem does not hold for them.
have become large. This effect of prior actions on security payoffs is not present in a repeated game, and it can result in "strategic gradualism," the property that contributions must be raised slowly over time in equilibrium.
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Overview of the Model and Results
A player's action/contribution in the games to be studied is a nonnegative real number that can be raised in any period in which the player can move. The only maintained assumption on the move structure is that each player can move in an infinite number of periods. Payoffs are given by either a discounted sum of stage game payoffs or, in the no-discounting case, by the lower limit of the sequence of stage game payoffs. Payoffs exhibit a weak positive spillovers property, and may have discontinuities due to the presence of thresholds in the provision of discrete public goods. All past actions are observable.
Every pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium generates a convergent path of contribution profiles. The profile to which the path converges is said to be achieved by the equilibrium.
The first set of results consists of necessary conditions that equilibrium paths and achievable profiles must satisfy.
The most novel necessary condition is that any achievable profile must be in a particular set, the undercore. Its definition is similar to that of the core, and does not depend on the dynamic structure of the game. A profile x is said to be underblocked by a coalition of players if there exists a smaller profile z x that prescribes zero contributions for the non-coalition players, and that each coalition member i prefers to x once she raises z i to the level she most prefers, holding z i fixed. A satiation profile is preferred by each player to any other profile obtained by raising just her contribution. The undercore is then the set of satiation profiles that are not underblocked. Theorem 1 establishes that all achievable profiles are in the undercore.
An interpretation of Theorem 1 is that an achievable profile must satisfy a certain fairness property: it must not require any coalition's contribution to be too large. Proposition 1 establishes that the core, as typically defined in similar settings (e.g., Foley (1970) ), is precisely the set of efficient profiles in the undercore. Theorem 1 thus tells us that any efficient profile that is not in the core is unachievable.
Theorem 2 establishes another necessary condition for achievability. In the discounting case, if the stage game payoff functions are differentiable and satisfy a strict positive spillovers property, then all achievable profiles are inefficient. In these games a core profile can at best be the limit of achievable profiles as the discount factor converges to one.
In some games with discounting, many undercore and core profiles are neither achievable nor limits of achievable profiles as the discount factor converges to one. This is dramatically illustrated by the binary public good game of Compte and Jehiel (2003) . This game has a unique achievable profile, given a sufficiently large discount factor, even though the undercore and core are continua of profiles. However, all undercore profiles are achievable in the no-discounting version of the game. Thus, in some games the set of achievable profiles expands discontinuously at D 1.
Theorem 3 identifies a familiar class of games in which this discontinuity is absent. In these games the aggregate contribution determines a public good quantity, and each player's payoff is quasilinear in her own contribution and smooth and strictly concave in the public good. Furthermore, a prisoners' dilemma (PD) property holds: starting from any profile, not raising her contribution further is each player's dominant strategy in the stage game. Lastly, the move structure is assumed to satisfy a weak cyclicity property which is satisfied by all commonly assumed move structures, such as the simultaneous and round robin ones. Under these assumptions, Theorem 3 shows that any neighborhood of any undercore profile contains a profile that is achievable if the discount factor is sufficiently large. The undercore is thus equal to both the closure of the set of profiles that are achievable for some < 1; and to the closure of the set of profiles that are achievable for D 1: Since the definition of the undercore is independent of the move structure, this result implies that in this class of games, the limiting set of achievable profiles is independent of the move structure.
The proof of Theorem 3 shows that any neighborhood of almost any undercore profile contains the limit of a sequence of profiles that is an equilibrium path for all large discount factors.
Thus, if the period length is small, it takes very little actual time for the path of contributions to reach any neighborhood of the profile being achieved. Strategic gradualism may be necessary in the sense that contributions cannot be raised to the ultimate goal in a finite number of periods, but it is not necessary in the sense that it must take a long time to approximately reach the goal.
The final result is Corollary 2, which derives three implications of the previous results for equilibrium payoffs. The first one is that any equilibrium payoff is weakly Pareto dominated by an undercore payoff. The second is that any equilibrium payoff that is efficient must be the payoff generated by a core profile. The third implication is that under the conditions of Theorem 3, any neighborhood of an undercore (and hence core) payoff contains an equilibrium payoff.
Related Literature
Gale (2001) studies dynamic contribution games in which the players do not discount. These games differ from those of this paper in that the stage-game payoff functions are assumed to be continuous and the actions multidimensional. The main result, Theorem 1, is that a profile is achievable if and only if it is "approachable", i.e., it is the limit of a feasible path of profiles and
gives each player at least as large a payoff as she can obtain on her own starting from any point on the path. Two lemmas in the present paper extend Gale's result to cases with discounting and discontinuous payoffs. Lemma 2 shows that approachability is necessary for achievability, and Lemma 5 shows that a generalization of approachability is sufficient for achievability if the prisoners' dilemma property holds.
Gale (2001) also has a sufficient condition for a profile to be achievable that does not refer to a path: any "strongly minimal positive satiation point" is achievable. Proposition 4 of this paper establishes conditions under which the same is true in the discounting case as the discount factor goes to one.
Also related is Lockwood and Thomas (2002) , which considers two-player games with discounting and continuous symmetric payoff functions satisfying the prisoners' dilemma property. When payoffs are differentiable, the profile achieved by the most efficient symmetric equilibrium is shown to be inefficiently small. Our Theorem 2 generalizes this result to any equilibrium, multiple players, and non-symmetric payoff functions. Lockwood and Thomas (2002) also show, in the differentiable case, that the most efficient symmetric equilibrium outcome converges to the symmetric efficient outcome as the discount factor goes to one, whether the players move simultaneously or alternately. (Pitchford and Snyder (2004) obtain a similar result.) This is a small hint of Corollary 2 .iii/; that under the conditions of Theorem 3, any core payoff is the limit of equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor goes to one, regardless (almost) of the move structure.
Lastly, Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) is somewhat related. It describes a mechanism that fully implements the core in a discrete public good setting, via a refinement of subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is similar to the dynamic contribution games studied here, except that it refunds the contributions each period that exceed the largest threshold point reached so far, and it stops the game in the first period in which the next threshold is not reached.
Organization
The model is set out in Section 2. Examples that motivate the questions and results are collected in Section 3. Necessary conditions for a path to be an equilibrium path and for a profile to be achievable are derived in Section 4. The structure of the undercore and core are delineated in Section 5. Sufficient conditions for a profile to be achievable are derived in Section 6.
Implications for equilibrium payoffs are in Section 7, and concluding comments in Section 8.
Appendices A D contains proofs missing from Sections 4 7; respectively.
Model
The set of players is N D f1 The stage-game payoff function is u : R n C ! R n : Both discounting and no-discounting cases are considered. In the discounting case, a path E x generates a continuation payoff in period t that is the usual weighted average of present and future stage-game payoffs:
where 2 .0; 1/ is the common discount factor. In the no-discounting . D 1/ case, payoffs are given by
Payoffs for the game as a whole are denoted without a superscript:
If the discount factor is not explicitly mentioned in a result, the result holds for all 2 .0; 1]:
The maintained assumptions about u begin with it taking the form
where
An interpretation is that f is a production function that uses the aggregate X to produce an amount y D f .X / of a public good that may have threshold provision points. Accordingly, f 6 Here, x x 0 means x i x 0 i for all iI x > x 0 means x 6 D x 0 and x x 0 I and
is assumed to be nondecreasing and right continuous. Refer to a profile that has an aggregate at which f is discontinuous as a threshold profile. Lastly, in order to insure that best replies exist and equilibrium paths converge, u is taken to satisfy a mild boundedness assumption:
The assumptions made so far are maintained throughout the paper. The resulting extensive form game is denoted as 0. ; E N /:
At times attention shall be restricted to payoffs that arise in a public good setting in which direct externalities are absent, i.e., O u i .y; x i ; x i / does not actually depend on x i : Two such settings that are of particular interest are the following:
where X is a threshold provision point. When referring to this setting, 0 < V i < X for each i;
and 0 < X < P i V i ; shall always be assumed. 
shall always be assumed. Both (BA) and (PS) hold in this setting, the latter strictly. To prove (BA) holds, note that concavity and (3) imply that for any unbounded fx k g;
A range of timing and economic scenarios give rise to games with the formal structure of
The following three are illustrative.
Scenario 1: Random Terminal Date
In this scenario the game ends at a random date Q T ; where Pr.
Consumption occurs only at the terminal date. At date t a player's expected continuation payoff
which is precisely as shown in (1). This scenario arises by allowing the players of the static normal form game defined by u to raise their actions incrementally period by period, subject to the specified random stopping rule that determines when the payoffs will be realized.
Scenario 2: Endogenous Terminal Date
In this scenario the terminal date is determined by the history of play. A preeminent example is contribution to a binary public project by impatient players, studied by, e.g., Admati
and Perry (1991) and Compte and Jehiel (2003) . The project is completed once the aggregate reaches a threshold X ; at which date player i receives a value V i : Players bear the cost of each incremental contribution,
; when it is made in period t. A path E x that completes the project at date T gives player i the payoff
where v i .X / D V i 1 fX X g : This yields our binary setting.
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An equivalent formulation is for the project to generate a flow of benefits, .1 /V i per period, subsequent to completion, rather than the one-period benefit V i upon completion. This brings us to the next scenario.
Scenario 3: Public Capital
Contributions in this scenario become the non-depreciating capital of one or more projects that produce a flow of future benefits over the infinite future. 
This payoff is as in (1) 
/:
If a scenario like this is the one of interest, it is important to interpret ! 1 as taking the period length rather than the discount rate to zero, since
If r were taken to zero, the present value of future benefits would go to infinity and the free rider problem would vanish.
Equilibrium Examples
In this paper, an unmodified "equilibrium" always denotes a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium. Refer to the outcome of an equilibrium is an equilibrium path. A profile is achievable if it is the limit of an equilibrium path. The examples of this section are intended to motivate and illustrate upcoming results and arguments.
Example 1. Binary Threshold
Consider the binary setting with two players and V 1 < V 2 : The efficient individually rational profiles satisfy X D X and x i V i : Let the move structure be the alternating one in which only player 1 .2/ is able to move in odd (even) numbered periods.
Whether there is discounting makes a radical difference in this example. In the no-discounting case, any efficient individually rational profile is achievable. For instance, let x be such a profile, and define a Markovian strategy profile as follows: if player i can move in period t, she
These strategies are characterized by two contribution goals. Player 1 is responsible for bringing the aggregate from 0 up to the first goal, x 1 ; and until she does so player 2 does nothing.
Player 2 is then responsible for bringing the aggregate up to the second and final goal, X : The equilibrium path is x 1 D .x 1 ; 0/ and x t D x for t > 1.
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In stark contrast, the discounting game with a sufficiently large has a unique equilibrium, the one just described with x D .X V 2 ; V 2 /: This is the result of Compte and Jehiel (2003) .
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The set of achievable profiles in this binary setting thus expands discontinuously at D 1.
Remark 1.
This discontinuity can even occur if payoffs are continuous.
The extreme nonconcavity at X acts like a threshold. An argument like that of Compte and Jehiel (2003) shows that the game has a unique equilibrium if is large enough, V 1 < V 2 < X ;
Example 2. Gradualism
Consider a two-player game in a neoclassical setting, with each v 0 i < 1 and the alternating move structure. Under these assumptions, in the no-discounting case, any x satisfying individual rationality, x i v i .X /; and no over-production, v .X V 2 ; V 2 /: A strategy profile that requires both players to contribute zero and punishes any unilateral deviation by the play of the appropriate one of these punishing equilibria is thus an equilibrium that achieves x D 0:
11 If < 1; the strategy defined by (5) for any efficient individually rational x with x 2 < V 2 is not subgame perfect. For, in a subgame starting in an even period t and x t 1 D .x 1 "; 0/; player 2 would deviate by raising X t 1 to X immediately instead of waiting two periods to do so, provided " < .1 2 /.V 2 x 2 /:
Figure 1 (b). An equilibrium path that achieves an efficient profile if δ = 1 . shaded region is the set of all profiles below x that are worse for both players than x: It contains the origin because x is individually rational. The indicated path E x converges to x: It is constructed by first having player 1 raise her contribution enough so that the resulting profile,
; 0/; gives player 2 the payoff u 2 .x/: Then player 2 raises hers enough to give player 1 the payoff u 1 .x/; and so on. The trigger strategy profile in which any deviation from this path triggers the play of the passive strategies, which are those that call for each player to never raise her contribution after any history, is an equilibrium when D 1. Obviously, no player can gain by deviating from the path. Off the path, the passive strategy profile is an equilibrium because neither player can gain by unilaterally raising her contribution.
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Any equilibrium path that achieves the x of Figure 1 (b) must exhibit gradualism in the sense that it achieves x only asymptotically. Neither player can increase her contribution too much in any period because doing so would result in a profile that the other player prefers to x, and thus that player could profitably deviate by never raising her contribution again. Any equilibrium path achieving x must therefore stay in the shaded region, ensuring gradualism.
Note, however, that this gradualism has no welfare cost because of the lack of discounting.
In contrast to the binary Example 1, discounting creates no discontinuity in this neoclassical 12 The equilibrum path in Figure 1 (b) is also generated by a Markov perfect equilibrium, a contribution goal equilibrium defined as in (5) but with an infinite sequence of goals.
example. As shall be shown, discounting shrinks the set of achievable profiles in a continuous way -there is no discontinuity at D 1: While no efficient profile is achievable if < 1; every neighborhood of an individually rational efficient profile contains an achievable profile if is sufficiently large.
Example 3. No Folk Theorem
The previous example suggests that under its payoff assumptions, any individually rational payoff vector should be achievable if D 1; and be the limit of achievable payoff vectors as ! 1: This conjecture is false, however, if the number of players is larger than two.
To construct a counterexample, let n D 3 and v i .X / D 1 .X C 1/ 1 . Note that the maxi-
Let x be any efficient and strictly individually rational profile satisfying x 3 D 0 and X > Y f1;2g . 13 We claim x is unachievable. To prove this, suppose E x is an equilibrium path achieving x:
would gain by not raising her contribution in period t or thereafter: she would then obtain a continuation payoff of at least u i .x and strict concavity imply that
We conclude that u i .x t / > u i .x/ for some i 2 f1; 2g. Fixing this i and letting x be the largest maximizer of u i in the set fx s g; we have u i .x / > u i .x s / for all s > . Therefore, the continuation payoff of player i in period C 1 if she deviates by never raising her contribution again, which is at least u i .x /; exceeds her continuation payoff from not deviating. So E x cannot be an equilibrium path.
The reason why x cannot be achieved in this example is that it specifies an overly large contribution from players 1 and 2. Because their joint contribution exceeds Y f1;2g and they are the only ones contributing, they both could be made better off in an incentive-free world by reducing their contributions. As we shall see, this is the condition which implies that given any feasible path converging to x; at least one of these players can profitably deviate. Which of them it is depends upon the path, and so it is necessary to consider the coalition f1; 2g of players as the entity able to "block" x from being achieved.
This example has features that simplify the argument but are not required. Its generalization in Theorem 1 below does not need x to be on the boundary, nor any u i to be concave or continuous.
Necessary Conditions
General necessary conditions are derived in this section for a path to be an equilibrium path, and for a profile to be achievable. Their derivations require two definitions.
First, a player's passive strategy is the strategy specifying that she not raise her contribution after any history. It is obviously a feasible strategy in any subgame, regardless of the move structure. Because of (PS), a player imposes the most severe punishment possible upon the other players by playing her passive strategy.
Second, the security payoff function u is defined as
(Lemma A1 in Appendix A establishes that this program has a solution.) In a subgame that starts from a profile x; player i can obtain a continuation payoff of at least u i .x/ by playing her myopic best reply to x and passively thereafter. Note that u i is nonincreasing in x i and, since u i satisfies (PS), nondecreasing in x i .
Necessary Conditions for Equilibrium Paths
Consider an equilibrium that generates a path E if the player is able to move in period t; E x must satisfy the following condition:
Another useful condition is obtained by considering an immediate deviation by player i to her passive strategy in period t: This deviation is feasible even if i = 2 N t ; and it yields a continuation payoff no less than u i .x
Thus, E x is an equilibrium path only if
The following lemma uses (8) and (BA) to show that equilibrium paths converge. It also establishes that if an equilibrium path that does not converge in a finite number of periods, the profile it achieves is not a threshold. This is because once a path comes close to a threshold, some player would want to deviate by raising her contribution enough to reach the threshold.
Lemma 1. Equilibrium paths converge. An equilibrium path that converges to a threshold profile does so in a finite number of periods.
We can now observe that in the no-discounting case, any continuation equilibrium payoff is equal to the payoff generated by the profile being achieved:
For, by Lemma 1, x is either a profile at which u is continuous, or it is achieved in a finite number of periods. In either case (9) follows from (2).
The path necessary conditions, (7) and (8), are used to prove the following lemma, which establishes that conditions like (9) hold regardless of the discount factor.
14 Lemma 2. If x is achieved by an equilibrium path E x; then
Furthermore, for all t > 0 and i 2 N ;
The next lemma is a simple consequence of (11). Suppose x is achieved by an equilibrium path E x. Suppose also that a profile z and a player i exist such that by some date all the other players have raised their contributions above what z specifies, but that at date 1 player i has not. Then u i .z/ u i .x/: If the opposite held, player i would want to deviate from the path at date :
Lemma 3. If x is achieved by an equilibrium path E x; then there does not exist a triple
; x i / > u i .x/, violating the necessary condition (11).
14 Gale (2001) defines a profile x to be approachable if it is the limit of a feasible path E x such that u i .x t 1 i ; x t i / u i .x/ for every t and i 2 N : He shows, in the no-discounting case with a continuous u; that any achievable profile is approachable. The second statement in Lemma 2 generalizes this to the discounting case and to payoffs with some discontinuities.
Necessary Conditions for Achievable Profiles
We now seek necessary conditions for achievability that do not refer to a feasible path. Path-free conditions are useful because they require less data to check. Furthermore, they do not depend on the nature of the game's move structure (except for its property that each player can move infinitely often).
Two necessary conditions are fairly obvious. Say that a profile x is a satiation profile if u .x/ D u.x/; and that it is individually rational if u .0/ u.x/: Lemma 4. Any achievable profile is an individually rational satiation profile.
We prove here in the text the necessity of individual rationality, as the proof is both simple and an introduction to the more general argument used below. So, suppose x is a profile for which u i .0/ > u i .x/ for some player i: Let be the first period in which player i can move.
Then, with respect to any feasible path that converges to x; the triple .0; i; / satisfies (a)-(c) of Lemma 3. This proves x is unachievable. Essentially, behind the formality, player i can gain be deviating as soon as possible from any path that converges to x, raising her contribution to whatever maximizes u i . ; x i / and then never raising it again.
We now formulate a condition more general than individual rationality that any achievable profile must satisfy. As the condition utilizes a concept related to that of "blocking" in cooperative game theory, it is natural to adopt a similar terminology. Refer to a nonempty subset of players as a coalition. Then, a profile x is underblocked by a coalition S if z x exists such that z S D 0 and u S .z/ u S .x/: This definition generalizes that of individual rationality, since a profile is individually rational if and only if it is not underblocked by a singleton coalition.
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Underblocked profiles are unachievable. The precise argument is given below in the proof of Theorem 1, but here is the gist of it. Suppose x is underblocked, say by coalition S using profile z: Let E x be any feasible path converging to x: Let be the first date at which x t exceeds z: The definition of insures that z i x 1 i for some coalition member i 2 S: (Which coalition member this is may depend on the path, unless S is a singleton). This construction yields a triple, .z; i; /; satisfying (a)-(c) of Lemma 3. Thus, x is not achievable.
We have now two necessary conditions for achievability, being a satiation profile and not being underblocked. Define the undercore to be the set of satiation profiles that are not underblocked, and denote it as D: The following is our first main result. by the first part of (12). It satisfies z i x i by the second part of (12) and the fact that z S D 0 x S : Lemma 3 thus implies that E x does not achieve x, a contradiction. This proves x is not underblocked, and so x 2 D:
The consequences of Theorem 1 are explored in the next section by examining the structure of the undercore. We end this section with a final necessary condition: in the discounting case, every achievable profile is inefficient if the payoffs are continuously differentiable and satisfy a strict version of (PS). 16, 17 Essentially, the sum of the player's gains from deviating are first order in the remaining amount to contribute, but the sum of their time-average future benefits from not deviating is second order in this amount.
Theorem 2. Suppose < 1; and u is continuously differentiable and satisfies @u i .x/=@ x j > 0 for all i 6 D j: Then any achievable profile is inefficient.
The Undercore
The undercore contains all achievable profiles by Theorem 1 and, as is shown in the next section, the reverse inclusion holds in a limiting sense in some settings. Uncovering the structure of the undercore will thus be useful for understanding the nature of achievable profiles. The first step is Lemma B1 in Appendix B, which shows that D is a compact set under the maintained assumptions.
16 Related results are obtained for special cases by Marx and Matthews (2000) , Lockwood and Thomas (2002) , and Pitchford and Snyder (2004) .
17 Achievable profiles may be efficient if payoffs are not differentiable, even if < 1. This is the case in Example
The undercore generally contains some but not all efficient profiles. Define the core, C; to be the set of profiles that are not blocked, where a profile x is blocked by a coalition S if and only if a profile z exists such that z S D 0 and u S .z/ > u S .x/: 18 As N blocks inefficient profiles, core profiles are efficient. The following proposition shows that the core consists precisely of the efficient profiles in the undercore.
Proposition 1. The core is the subset of profiles in the undercore that are efficient:
In a binary setting, straightforward arguments show that the core is the entire set of efficient individually rational profiles:
The undercore differs only by containing the origin:
Thus, in a binary setting with discounting, much of the undercore may be unachievable. Recall that in Example 1, just one profile is achievable when < 1; but the entire undercore is achievable when D 1.
We end this section with a characterization of the core and undercore in neoclassical settings. In these settings the surplus function for a coalition S; 
Roughly speaking, a coalition S cannot underblock a satiation profile x if either it cannot block it, or if X is sufficiently small that S can not block it using any z x: This intuition is formalized in the first part of the following proposition.
Proposition 3. In a neoclassical setting, the undercore is the set of satiation profiles satisfying, for all coalitions S;
Equivalently, the undercore is the set of satiation profiles satisfying, for all coalitions S;
For a given aggregate X; the inequalities in (15) 
The undercore does not include individually rational profiles like the indicated x because they are not satiation profiles. Such a profile cannot be achieved for any 1 because, once a profile sufficiently close to x is reached, player 2 would deviate by raising the aggregate up to Y f2g > X: The payoff u.x/ is not also generated by any undercore profile.
In the following numerical example, the undercore payoffs are again a strict subset of the feasible individually rational payoffs. The core payoffs are a strict subset of the individually rational efficient payoffs. This is generally the case when there are more than two players. 
The set of undercore payoffs is u.
Observe that u.D/ is a strict subset of the set of individually rational payoffs that arise from
The core consists of the undercore profiles for which X D 9; which can be written as C D x 2 R 3 : X D 9; 1 x i 5 : Note that the set of core payoffs,
is a strict subset of the individually rational efficient payoffs, Q u 2 R 3 :
Sufficient Conditions
The main result of this section is that under certain conditions in a neoclassical setting, almost any undercore profile is achievable if the discount factor is close enough to one. Note that some restriction of the setting is required, as the result is untrue in general. Recall that only one of the continuum of undercore profiles in Example 1 is achievable if < 1, but they are all achievable if D 1:
Sufficient Conditions for Equilibrium Paths
The first step is to find a condition under which (7) is sufficient as well as necessary for a path to be an equilibrium path. This will be useful because it allows the analysis to focus on paths, which are much simpler than strategies.
Recall that (7) requires, for i 2 N t ; that the continuation payoff U t i .E x; / from not deviating be no less than the security payoff u i .x
x satisfies (7), player i will not want to deviate from the path at date t if the strategies that will then be played give her a continuation payoff no greater than u i .x
This is the case if deviations trigger the passive strategies. 19 The strategy profile in which E x is played and any deviation triggers the passive strategies is therefore an equilibrium that generates E x; provided that the passive strategy profile is itself an equilibrium of any subgame. This is true if (and only if) every profile is a satiation profile. Accordingly, (7) is a sufficient condition for E x to be an equilibrium path if the following "Prisoners' Dilemma" property holds:
Commonly assumed, (PD) implies that each player's dominant strategy in any stage game is to not raise her contribution. The following lemma records the result just proved.
Lemma 5. If u satisfies (PD), then for any 2 .0; 1]; a feasible E x is an equilibrium path of Remark 2. In the no-discounting case, (PD) in Lemma 5 can be weakened to the assumption that u is continuous. This is established by Theorem 1 of Gale (2001) . The key step in proving this is to show that when D 1; any subgame starting from any profile x has, for any player i; an equilibrium giving player i her security payoff u i .x/: These maximally punishing equilibria can then be used instead of the passive strategies to prove the sufficiency of (7). It is an open question how much (PD) can be weakened in Lemma 5 when < 1:
Due to discounting, one more mild assumption shall be made. Discounting implies that rewards and punishments can influence current behavior only if they are not delayed too long.
Hence, the interval between the times at which a player can move should not grow too quickly as the game progresses. This is ensured if the move structure E N satisfies a cyclicity property:
(CY) integer m > 0 exists such that i 2 N .nkCi/m for all i 2 N and k 0:
This property specifies that player 1 is able to move at date m; player 2 at date 2m; and so on until the pattern repeats with player 1 able to move at date .n C 1/m: There are no restrictions on who else can move at dates that are multiples of m; nor on who can move at any other date. The following lemma establishes that if E N satisfies (CY), then any equilibrium path of the round-robin game passes through the same profiles as does an equilibrium path of a game that has the move structure E N and a certain larger discount factor. This result will allow attention to be restricted to the round-robin structure.
Lemma 6. Suppose u satisfies (PD), E N satisfies (CY), and E x is an equilibrium path of 0. ; E N R / for some 2 .0; 1]: Then 0.
1=m ; E N / has an equilibrium path E z that passes through the same profiles as does E x:
The path E z in Lemma 6 is obtained by slowing down the round-robin path E x: player 1 moves in period m instead of period 1; player 2 moves in period 2m instead of period 2; and so on.
Property (CY) insures that this new path is feasible for E N : Along this new path the future reward a player receives for raising her contribution in the current period is postponed, but raising the discount factor to 1=m increases its present value enough to restore incentives.
Sufficient Conditions for Achievability
Before presenting the sufficiency result for the discounting case, it is useful to consider the analogous result obtained by Gale (2001) is achievable in the no-discounting case.
The set D 0 of strongly minimal satiation profiles plays a role in the discounting case as well.
Observe that its definition is nearly the same as that of the undercore. Since any underblocked satiation profile is not strongly minimal, D 0 D is always true. In most settings of interest, D is in fact the closure of D 0 ; so that the two sets are essentially the same. This is true in both the binary and, as the next lemma implies, neoclassical settings.
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Lemma 7. In a neoclassical setting, c` x 2 D 0 :
The following proposition is the central result of this section. It establishes that if (PD) and (CY) hold in a neoclassical setting, then essentially any profile in D 0 is achievable for all < 1 sufficiently large. Furthermore, the same equilibrium path achieves the profile for all large discount factors.
Proposition 4. For any neoclassical setting satisfying (PD) and E N satisfying (CY), suppose
Then there exists a path E x converging to x; and a discount factor < 1; such that E x is an equilibrium path of 0. ; E N / for all 2 [ ; 1]:
Before discussing the structure of the proof of this proposition, we first consider some its implications for the set of achievable allocations. Denote the set of achievable profiles in 0. ; E N / as A. ; E N /; and let
That is, A. E N / is the closure of the set of profiles that can be achieved for all large discount factors less than one. The analogous set in the no-discounting case is
Both sets are always in the undercore, by Theorem 1. (The result of Gale (2001) The second consequence bears on the issue of gradualism. Under the assumptions of these results, almost any achievable profile is achieved by the same equilibrium path for all large discount factors. Now, the time it takes a fixed path to reach any given neighborhood of its limiting profile becomes negligible as the period length becomes small. Thus, essentially all achievable profiles can be achieved instantaneously in the limit as the period length goes to zero. Even though (PD) implies that strategic gradualism is necessary in the sense that no equilibrium path achieves a non-zero profile in a finite number of periods, there is no real-time gradualism if the period length is arbitrarily short.
The third consequence bears on the relevance of the move structure. The result that both A 1 . E N / and A. E N / are equal to the set D; which does not depend on E N ; tells us that the set of profiles that can be achieved for either D 1 or as ! 1 is independent of the move structure.
Both the simultaneous and round-robin structures, for example, give rise to the same set of limiting achievable profiles. Of course, for a fixed < 1 the set of achievable profiles does generally depend on the move structure.
We end this section with an overview of the proof of Proposition 4. In light of Lemma 6, it only needs to be proved for the round-robin structure. Consider a nonzero x 2 D 0 satisfying
The proof begins by finding two profiles, N x and O x; that satisfy N x < O x < x and
The proof that these profiles exist depends on the assumption X < Y N .x/ .
Because v is strictly concave, O x can be chosen so that it too is in D 0 . The proof then has three steps.
Step 1 consists of the construction of a round-robin path starting at N x and converging to x.
Each player raises her contribution the same proportional amount towards x when it is her turn to move. The increases are made small enough that u.x/ u.x t / is always positive. But this difference shrinks to zero so quickly that for all large , player i's continuation payoff is close enough to u i .x/ that she is willing to raise her contribution in the current period. This step uses X < Y N .x/ and the concavity of v:
Step 2 uses the fact that O x is strongly minimal. Adapting an argument in Gale (2001) Step 3 puts together the sequences obtained in the previous steps to yield a path E x that converges to x and is feasible for E N R : For x t N x; the construction of Step 1 insures that the remainder of the path is a continuation equilibrium path if is large. For x t < N x; u.x t / is bounded strictly below u.x/; and so again the continuation payoffs from E x exceed any deviation payoff if is large. The path E x is thus an equilibrium path for large .
Equilibrium Payoffs
The results obtained so far about achievable profiles have implications for equilibrium payoffs.
The following corollary is about the limits of sequences of equilibrium payoffs for discount factors less than one. For a move structure E N , this set of payoffs is
/ for some equilibrium path E x and 2 .0; 1/ :
Of natural interest are the efficient payoffs in this set, those for which Q u D u.x/ for some efficient
Corollary 2.
.i/ For any Q u 2 P. E N /; an undercore payoff u 0 2 u.D/ exists such that Q u u 0 :
.ii/ Any efficient Q u 2 P. E N / is a core payoff: Q u 2 u.C/:
.iii/ In a neoclassical setting satisfying (PD), P. E N / contains all undercore (and hence core) payoffs for all E N satisfying (CY).
Part .i/ shows that equilibrium payoffs are bounded above by undercore payoffs. This and the fact that the only efficient undercore profiles are core profiles implies .ii/, that any efficient payoff that approximates an equilibrium payoff is a core payoff. Part .iii/ establishes that all core payoffs are approximate equilibrium payoffs in a neoclassical setting satisfying (PD), if the move structure is cyclical.
Remark 3. Similar results hold in the no-discounting case. By Theorem 1, any equilibrium payoff of 0.1; E N / is in u.D/: Proposition 1 thus implies that any equilibrium payoff that is efficient is a core payoff. By Theorem 3, u.D/ is equal to the closure of the set of equilibrium payoffs in a neoclassical setting given (PD) and (CY).
Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to describe the achievable profiles and equilibrium payoffs of a range of dynamic contribution games. The central construct was the undercore, a set of profiles determined by the payoff functions independently of the dynamic structure of the game. The most general result obtained was that for any dynamic contribution game, only profiles in this set are achievable. This theorem has welfare implications: the only efficient payoffs that are even approximately achievable are the core payoffs. It also has theoretical implications: there is no folk theorem for this class of games. Lastly, it may have empirical implications: since the undercore is often readily characterized, whether only undercore profiles are achieved should be testable in the field or laboratory.
In the discounting case, generally not all undercore profiles are achievable. But in some settings they are, such as the neoclassical public good settings satisfying the prisoners' dilemma property. In these settings, if the move structure is cyclical, the entire undercore is the limit of the set of achievable profiles as the discount factor increases to one. One implication is that all commonly assumed move structures yield this same set of achievable profiles. Another implication is a lack of gradualism: almost any achievable profile can be approximately reached arbitrarily quickly as the period length shrinks to zero. One task for the future is to determine the extent to which these results hold for other payoff functions. and
This contradicts (BA). Hence, (6) has a solution. 
Now let fx
The other case to consider is b i .x/ > x i : In this case, for large k; we have z k i < b i .x/; and so
We conclude that in either case, lim inf u i .x
Proof of Lemma 1. Let E x be an equilibrium path, and assume it does not converge. Then, since it is nondecreasing, it is unbounded. By (BA), i exists such that
Thus, u i has a positive, finite number of maximizers on the set fx s g s 0 : Let x 1 be the maximizer with the largest superscript. Then for < 1 we have
23 In fact u i is continuous, but we only need its right continuity in x i :
and for D 1 we have
This contradicts the necessary condition (8). Therefore E x must converge.
Now let x be a profile achieved asymptotically by an equilibrium path E x; so that X s < X for all s: Then, f .X s / converges to the left-hand limit f .X /, and u.x s / converges to
where the first inequality follows from O ; and the second from (7). Since . O x t i ; x t i / ! x; taking the limit along the infinite subsequence of dates t that satisfy i 2 ; x i such that she could obtain a continuation payoff of at least u i .x i ; x i / > u i .x / by raising her contribution only to x i in period t and subsequently playing passively. This is contrary to E x being an equilibrium path. We conclude that E x converges asymptotically to x :
Now, for any i 2 N and t 1; from (8) 
Reverse the summation order in the double sum to obtain
Now, let " > 0, and let B be an open ball centered at x such that for any x 2 B and i; j 2 N ;
(Such a ball exists because each u ii .x / < 0 and each u i j is continuous.) Since 
and, since W j .x / 0; 
Simplify this, using
It remains to show that x is not underblocked, as this will now imply x 2 D. Assume x is underblocked. Then a coalition S and a profile z x exist such that z i D 0 and u S .z/ u S .x/: Suppose z i D x i for some i 2 S: Then, since z i x i and x is a satiation profile,
This contradiction implies z S x S : For any i 2 N we have, since u i is upper semicontinuous,
Hence, for large k we have 
then O x would also be efficient and u. O x/ D u.x/. This is not possible because of the assumption that distinct efficient profiles generate distinct payoffs. We conclude
Proof of Proposition 2. If S blocks x using z; then summing u i .z/ and u i .x/ over i 2 S yields
since Z D Z S : As the left side of this inequality is no greater than V .S/; this proves that if (13) holds for all coalitions S; then x 2 C:
To prove the converse, suppose x 2 C; but (13) does not hold for some coalition S: Then,
Lemma B3. In a neoclassical setting, a satiation profile x is underblocked if and only if for some coalition S;
Proof. Suppose x is underblocked by S: By Lemma B2, z < x exists such that z S D 0 and u S .x/ u S .z/: Summing these inequalities over S and using Z S D Z yields
This and Z X imply Z < X S : 
Define z 2 R n by z S D 0; and
we have and so (14) . This proves that (14) and (15) 
x is a satiation profile. To show that x 2 D; we let S be a coalition and verify that (15) holds. To do this, we can assume X S > Y S ; and show from this
Since each v i is concave and Y S < X Y N ; we have
These three displayed inequalities together yield
which rearranges to the desired X S P i2S v i .X / V .S/.
C. Proofs Missing from Section 6
Proof of Lemma 6. Define E z by letting the players move as in E x; but only at dates that are In E z player i moves only at dates .nk C i/m; since in E x she moves only at dates nk C i: The path E z is feasible for E N by (CY), since i 2 N .nkCi/m : Since E x is an equilibrium path of 0. ; E N R /, it achieves some profile x by Lemma 1). Thus, E z also converges to x. We use Lemma 5 to prove that E z is an equilibrium path of 0.
Consider first the case D 1: Fix i 2 N and t 1: Since E x is an equilibrium path of
The construction of E z implies that exists such that .z 
which we now show. The definitions of E z and O imply
Because .E x; / satisfies (8) at date p; we have
Putting the two previous displays together yields Assume x is not strongly minimal. Then a coalition S and profile z < x exist such that z S D 0 and u S .x/ u S .z/: Since x is a satiation profile, the argument used to prove Lemma B2
shows that we can find such a z such that u S .z/ D u S .z/: Using this z; we have u S .x/ u S .z/:
Summing these inequalities over S yields
and this implies P 
Now, since each v i is strictly concave, 2 .0; 1/; and O X 6 D X ; we have
This and (27) imply P i2S v i .X / X S > V .S/; contrary to (25). So x is strongly minimal.
Case (b).
In this case O X > X , and so (26) Thus, E x is an equilibrium path of 0.1; E N / by Lemma 5.
Accordingly, we only need to find a path E x that converges to x and a number < 1 such that E x is an equilibrium path of 0. ; E N / for all 2 [ ; 1/: By Lemma 6, it suffices to prove this 
This implies
Similarly, for any k 1; 
and
Turning to the desired inequality (28), note that it is equivalent to 
Thus, A 0 for 0 :D .1 C "/ 1=n : As 0 does not depend on t;
Step 1 is proved.
Step 2 
